Revenue divergence and competitive balance in a divisional sports league by Dobson, S & Goddard, J
 
 
Revenue Divergence and Competitive Balance  
in a Divisional Sports League  
 
 
 
Stephen Dobson* 
 
and 
 
John Goddard^ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The North American model of resource allocation in professional sports leagues is adapted 
for English (association) football. The theoretical relationship between revenue and 
competitive balance is shown to be robust with respect to changes in teams’ objectives and 
labour market conditions. Empirical revenue functions are reported for 1926-1999. These 
indicate a shift in the composition of demand favouring big-city teams and an increase in the 
sensitivity of revenue to performance. An analysis of match results in the FA Cup 
competition suggests an increase in competitive imbalance between teams at different levels 
of the league’s divisional hierarchy, as the theory suggests. 
 
JEL Code: L83 
 
 
* Department of Economics, University of Otago, P.O.Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
Phone: +64 3 479 5296. Fax: +64 3 479 8174. Email: sdobson@business.otago.ac.nz 
 
^ Department of Economics, University of Wales Swansea, Singleton Park, Swansea, SA2 
8PP, UK. Tel: +44 1792 295168. Fax: +44 1792 295872. Email: j.a.goddard@swan.ac.uk 
Revenue Divergence and Competitive Balance in a Divisional Sports League 
 
I Introduction 
The implications for competitive balance of various institutional and structural characteristics 
of professional team sports markets are a key feature of the economics of sports literature. A 
major concern has been the impact on competitive balance of free agency in the players’ 
labour market. Some twenty years before the introduction of free agency in North American 
(NA) baseball, Rottenberg (1956) argued that provided there was unrestricted trade between 
teams in players, free agency should not affect competitive balance. Profit maximising teams 
employ playing talent to the point that marginal revenue products (the revenue generated 
from the last unit of talent employed) are equal across teams, so there are no unexploited 
opportunities for mutually profitable trade in players. According to the invariance 
proposition, the location of this point does not depend on players’ contractual arrangements, 
and is therefore unaffected by the introduction of free agency. Contrary to the received 
wisdom of many sports policymakers and commentators, a ‘free-for-all’ in the labour market 
should neither cause the best players to gravitate to the economically most powerful and 
highest-paying teams, nor cause competitive balance to decline.     
 
Rottenberg’s theoretical insights were formalised by El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) (EHQ), and 
have since been tested empirically by, among others, Scully (1989), Fort and Quirk (1995), 
Vrooman (1995) and Eckard (1998). Recently this literature has been reviewed by Eckard 
(2001), who finds that “(t)aken together, the results are consistent with the invariance 
proposition, namely, balance did not change” (p430). Eckard’s own interpretation, supported 
both theoretically and empirically, is that competitive balance in baseball may actually have 
improved somewhat during the free agency era. 
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In the EHQ model, relative market sizes are the final arbiter of the allocation of playing talent 
between teams, and therefore of competitive balance. The model is therefore demand-driven. 
While the empirical NA literature tends to concentrate on the link between institutional 
characteristics of the supply side and competitive balance, the present article focuses 
primarily on demand-side determinants of competitive balance. Specifically, it seeks to 
demonstrate and draw connections between two empirical propositions concerning 
professional (association) football (or soccer) in England and Wales (EW): first, between the 
1920s and 1990s there was increasing divergence in the base levels of spectator demand 
enjoyed by teams with distinct identifying characteristics; and second, over the same period 
there was increasing competitive imbalance within the league as a whole. According to the 
EHQ model, the second proposition should follow directly from the first. Since long-term 
change in the composition of demand has been a major factor affecting football’s historical 
development in EW, the latter should provide a vehicle for empirical scrutiny of the theory, 
from a perspective that differs from that of most of the NA literature.         
 
The article is structured as follows. Section II discusses the adaptation of the EHQ model into 
a form suitable for the analysis of English football. Section III presents estimated revenue 
functions for football teams in EW, and draws inferences about the phenomenon of revenue 
divergence. Section IV discusses the measurement of competitive balance between teams 
operating at different levels of a hierarchical, divisional league structure. A statistical analysis 
of win probabilities in cup ties (in which teams from different divisions meet head-on) is used 
to identify trends in competitive balance. Section V summarises and concludes.  
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II Revenue and competitive balance: theoretical considerations 
Section II discusses the adaptation of the EHQ model to English football. For present 
purposes, the stylised two-team version of EHQ’s n-team model employed by Fort and Quirk 
(1995) and Vrooman (1995) will suffice. The revenue functions for team i (i=1,2) are: 
 
Ri = kPiδWiβ           [1] 
 
In [1] Ri = revenue; Pi = home-town population (P1>P2 is assumed); Wi = win ratio = 
Ti/(T1+T2) where Ti is the quantity of playing talent employed by team i; δ and β are the 
elasticities of revenue with respect to home-town population and win ratio respectively; and k 
is constant. 
 
It is straightforward to establish a relationship between the parameters δ and β, and the level 
of competitive balance, measured by the ratio of win ratios W1/W2, also equivalent to the 
ratio of talent employed T1/T2. It is assumed that teams are profit maximisers. The total 
quantity of talent is assumed fixed (and scaled so that T1+T2=1 and Wi=Ti) and c, the wage 
cost per unit of talent, is assumed to be endogenous. The teams compete to attract talent, 
forcing c to a level at which the profit maximising conditions for both teams are satisfied. 
Individually, however, each team treats c as given, and selects Ti to maximise its own profit, 
πi = Ri – cTi. The first-order conditions are βPiδTiβ–1 = c for i=1,2. This leads to the 
equilibrium condition: 
 
T1/T2 = W1/W2 = (P1/P2)δ/(1-β)        [2] 
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Given the elasticities δ and β, competitive balance is determined by the ratio of the home-
town populations P1 and P2. 
 
The application of this theoretical literature to professional team sports in Europe is still in its 
infancy. Recently, however, models originally developed in NA have been adapted to 
investigate a number of specific policy issues. Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) consider the 
influence of the involvement of the most successful teams in European-level tournaments for 
competitive balance in their domestic leagues. The incentive to recruit sufficient talent to 
succeed at European level causes domestic competitive balance to deteriorate, perhaps to the 
point that the small-market teams become economically non-viable. Késenne (2000) explores 
the implications for competitive balance of the hypothetical introduction of a NA-style salary 
cap in European football. More generally, the institutional, historical and economic 
characteristics of professional football in EW differ from those of the leading NA 
professional sports in respect of (at least) five major characteristics (see also Fort, 2000), 
which need to be addressed in order to develop a suitable adaptation of the EHQ model.  
 
(i) Membership of the top professional sports leagues in NA is determined by the award of 
franchises. In contrast English football’s Premier League (PL) and Football League (FL) 
comprise a hierarchical divisional structure. At the end of each season, several teams are 
promoted and relegated between divisions, so divisional membership is determined by 
competitive prowess.1 From casual inspection of PL and FL revenues data, it is clear that 
revenues are primarily dependent on a team’s position within the league rather than within its 
own division. The inclusion of the win ratio, Wi, in [1] is therefore inappropriate, but it is 
appropriate to replace Wi with  Ti/(T1+T2) because league position is monotonic in Ti. For 
empirical purposes if n, the number of league member teams, is large, Ti/(T1+T2) can be 
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approximated on a numerical scale from 1 to 1/n by Li = (n+1–posi)/n, where posi is team i’s 
league position (1=top of PL; n=bottom of FL).2  
 
(ii) In each of the major NA sports, the introduction of free agency was a once-and-for-all 
event. In English football, progress toward free agency has been incremental. Before 1978 a 
player could only move from one team to another with his current employer’s consent. From 
1978 a player whose contract had expired became entitled to move regardless of his 
employer’s wishes. His new employer, however, would be liable to pay compensation in the 
form of a transfer fee. Following the 1995 European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in the 
Bosman case, out-of-contract players over the age of 24 became entitled to move without 
liability for compensation. Full free agency rights were thereby established. Before 1978 
teams motivated primarily by winning not profit (see below) probably had little incentive, 
and could not be forced, to allow their best players to move. Since 1978 and especially since 
1995, mobility (at the players’ behest) has increased considerably, driven in part by 
differences in teams’ financial positions and ability-to-pay. A closer relationship between 
demand shifts and competitive balance might therefore be expected post-1978 than pre-1978.          
 
(iii) Because few (if any) other countries operate professional leagues in the same sports on a 
comparable scale, product and labour markets in NA (especially at the top level) are 
effectively closed. A regulation restricting to three the number of non-British players PL and 
FL teams could field at any one time remained in force until 1995, when the ECJ adjudged 
the application of this provision to EU nationals to be counter to European employment law.3 
The EHQ model’s closed labour market assumption is therefore a reasonable approximation 
to the true situation in football in EW for most of the period under scrutiny. Post-1995, 
however, many foreign players have been employed, especially by PL teams. In the model an 
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open labour market dictates the removal of the restriction that T1+T2 is fixed. One team can 
increase its stock of talent without depleting that of the other team, by recruiting additional 
talent from abroad.  
 
(iv) The EHQ model assumes that each team’s spectator demand is proportional to its home-
town population: a reasonable assumption in NA where each team’s catchment area is 
predominantly local (due to large distances between towns), and each town has only one 
team. In football in EW neither of these conditions prevails. Geographical segmentation 
between spectator catchment areas is less than in NA because distances are small. Wherever 
they reside, regular travel to home and away fixtures is a practical proposition for many 
sports fans. Home-town population is therefore a highly imperfect indicator of each team’s 
popularity. In [1] Piδ is therefore replaced by Ai, a set of fixed-effects capturing all relevant 
demographic, socio-economic and historical influences on team i’s base level of spectator 
demand.  
 
(v) Finally, due partly to the restrictions the franchise system imposes on supply, and partly 
to the restraining influence on wage expenditure of salary caps in football and basketball, 
most NA teams are highly profitable (Quirk and Fort, 1999). Profit maximising assumptions 
have been adopted in much of the academic literature, with little dissent. In EW in contrast, 
the intense competitive pressure generated by the league’s divisional structure has certainly 
contributed to the chronic loss-making propensities of most PL and FL teams. Following 
Sloane (1971), some researchers have argued that win, revenue or utility maximisation 
subject to a financial constraint may be a more suitable objective function than profit 
maximisation (Késenne, 1996, 1999). On the other hand, the extensive commercialisation of 
football during the 1990s (of which the stock market flotation of several teams is one 
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manifestation) suggests that profit maximisation may yet be appropriate in some cases. The 
theoretical analysis that follows remains agnostic on this issue, and derives equilibria under 
both profit and win-maximising assumptions.  
 
Taking account of (i) to (v) above, it is possible to re-work the two-team model. The adapted 
revenue functions for team i (i=1,2) are: 
 
Ri = Ai{Ti/(T1+T2)}β          [3] 
 
A1>A2 is assumed. Under profit maximising assumptions with a closed labour market 
(T1+T2=1) and c determined endogenously, the model is essentially the same as in the NA 
case. The competitive balance equilibrium is: 
 
T1/T2 = (A1/A2)1/(1-β)          [4] 
 
Under profit maximising assumptions with an open labour market (no restrictions on T1 and 
T2) it is reasonable to assume c is exogenous. For team 1 the first-order condition is:  
 
A1β{T1/(T1+T2)}β-1{T2/(T1+T2)2}=c        [5] 
 
Using [5] and the equivalent expression for team 2 to solve for T1 and T2 yields the 
competitive balance equilibrium: 
 
T1/T2 = (A1/A2)1/(2-β)           [6] 
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Comparing [6] with [4], competition is more balanced if the labour market is open. Because 
team 1’s employment of additional talent does not simultaneously deplete team 2’s talent, it 
is not in team 1’s interest to hire talent and dominate competition to the same extent as in the 
closed model.  
  
Under win maximisation with a zero profit constraint, the teams employ talent to the break-
even point, πi = Ri – cTi = 0. In the closed model the break-even conditions yield: 
 
A1T1β = cT1 ;  A2(1 – T1)β = c(1 – T1)     [7] 
 
Eliminating c and solving for T1 and T2 yields: 
 
T1 = (A1/A2)1/(1-β)/{1 + (A1/A2)1/(1-β)} ;  T2 =1/{1 + (A1/A2)1/(1-β)}   [8] 
 
[8] in turn gives rise to a competitive balance equilibrium identical to [4].  
 
In the open model the break-even condition for team 1 is: 
 
A1{T1/(T1+T2)}β – cT1 = 0         [9] 
 
Using [9] and the equivalent expression for team 2 to solve for T1 and T2 yields: 
 
T1=(A1/c){(A1/A2)1/(1-β)/[1+(A1/A2)1/(1-β)]}β ;  T2=(A2/c){1/[1+(A1/A2)1/(1-β)]}β      [10] 
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In common with [8], [10] gives rise to a competitive balance equilibrium identical to [4]. [2] 
or [4] therefore turns out to be a highly robust result, valid under profit maximisation with a 
closed labour market, or under win maximisation with a closed or open labour market. Even 
under profit maximisation with an open labour market, the functional form of [6] is the same 
as [4], and the direction of the effect of changes in Ai and β is the same. Competition should 
become more unbalanced: (i) if the difference between A1 and A2 increases; or (ii) if β 
increases. (i) follows from the property that each team’s competitive strength is proportional 
to its relative market size. The intuition for (ii) is that if the sensitivity of revenue to winning 
increases, it is efficient for the big-market team to employ more talent than before and the 
small-market team less, because the former’s revenue gain exceeds the latter’s loss. 
  
III Empirical revenue functions for football teams in England and Wales 
Section III reports empirical counterparts of the theoretical revenue functions developed in 
section II. The data set comprises annual gate revenues for all PL and FL football teams 
between the 1926-7 and 1998-9 seasons inclusive, obtained from the FL’s archives and 
Football Trust (various issues).4  
 
To describe the main changes in the distribution of revenue between PL and FL member 
teams with broadly similar demographic, geographic and historical characteristics, Dobson 
and Goddard (1998, 2001) have classified teams into five groups. G1 (Group 1) contains  
four major London teams that tend to attract significant levels of support from all parts of 
London and beyond (Arsenal, Chelsea, Tottenham and West Ham), and ten major teams from 
five other cities with populations larger than 500,000: Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, 
Manchester and Sheffield. G2 contains teams from northern and midlands cities with 
populations in the range 250,000-500,000. G3 contains teams from southern towns other than 
 9
London, and the smaller London teams not included in G1, whose support tends to be more 
localised. The two remaining groups contain teams from smaller northern and midlands 
towns, sub-divided into pre-1922 (G4) and post-1922 (G5) league entrants.5  
 
Between the 1920s and 1990s there were marked contrasts in fortunes between groups, in 
terms of both performance and revenue indicators. Summary data are shown in panels (a) and 
(b) of Table 1. These show, for example, that while the performance of the big-city teams in 
G1 remained almost constant, G1’s revenue share increased by over ten percentage points 
between the 1920s and 1990s. Until the end of the 1980s G3 enjoyed a sustained 
improvement in performance as football’s geographical balance of power shifted towards the 
south. G3’s gain in revenue share, however, was less pronounced. The improvement in G3’s 
performance appears not to have been driven by a shift in the composition of demand; rather, 
it seems likely to reflect a catching-up process, as southern teams (many of which joined the 
FL later than their counterparts from similar-sized northern towns) gradually worked their 
way up the league’s divisional hierarchy.  
 
Economists, sociologists and social historians have all attempted to explain the shift in the 
composition of demand favouring the big-city teams at the expense of their small-town 
counterparts (Dunning et al., 1988; Walvin, 1994; Russell, 1997). The geographical bond 
between teams and their spectators certainly appears to have been stronger in the first half of 
the 20th century than subsequently. Prior to the late-1950s financial and logistical constraints 
militated against regular long-distance travel to sports fixtures for most spectators. Thereafter 
rising affluence, combined with improvements in public and private transport enabled big-
city teams, in particular, to begin to draw support at a national rather than purely local or 
regional level, and to drain support from small-town teams. Demographic change also tended 
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to weaken links between communities and their local teams. Suburbanisation implied 
population shifts away from urban districts where most stadia were located. Meanwhile the 
expanding reach of televised football focused public attention on a handful of star players of 
the most glamorous teams, also favouring the latter at the expense of their less widely 
exposed small-town counterparts. 
 
The effects of such developments are incorporated into the empirical revenue functions 
reported below by allowing for variation over time and between groups in the revenue 
function parameters. Adding time-subscripts and a disturbance term to [3]; using a league 
position variable as a proxy for each team’s share of talent (see section II); normalising by 
expressing team revenues as a proportion of total revenue; and applying a log transformation, 
yields the following specification: 
 
ln(ri,t) = αi,t + βt ln(Li,t) + ui,t                 [11] 
 
In [11] ri,t = Ri,t/ ; Ri,t and Li,t are equivalent to Ri (revenue) and Li (league position) as 
defined in section II; ui,t is a random disturbance term; and αi,t and βt are time-varying 
parameters of the revenue function. For [11] to be estimable, some restrictions on αi,t and βt 
are required. Both are assumed to be polynomial in t.6 
∑
i
t,iR
  
The revenue function estimation results are reported in Table 1. Panel (c) reports the group 
mean values of exp( ) (the empirical counterparts of the fixed effects Ai in [3] to [10]) for 
selected seasons. These provide an indication of shifts between groups in the composition of 
aggregate spectator demand for the league as a whole, after controlling for team performance. 
For G1, as expected there is a pronounced increase in the mean value of exp( ), especially 
t,iαˆ
t,iαˆ
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between the 1950s and 1970s. Meanwhile, the downward trend for G3 reflects the failure of 
this group’s revenue share to match its long-term improvement in performance, as discussed 
above.  
 
The cross-sectional standard deviation (across all teams) of t,iαˆ  in [11], denoted s( ), 
provides a convenient summary measure of divergence between clubs in the composition of 
aggregate spectator demand. Panel (d) of Table 1 shows that s(
t,iαˆ
t,iαˆ ) has increased over time. 
There was relatively little variation before the end of the 1950s, but the trend was upward in 
the 1960s. Following a levelling out in the 1970s and 1980s, a further sharp increase occurred 
in the 1990s. Panel (e) of Table 1 shows a (broadly) parallel increase in . This elasticity is 
estimated to have risen from below 0.25 to above 0.50 between the 1920s and 1990s. Figures 
1 and 2 plot the movement in the series s(
tβˆ
t,iαˆ ) and  over the entire estimation period. tβˆ
 
IV Measuring competitive balance using FA Cup match results data  
In the empirical NA team sports literature, it is standard practice to measure competitive 
balance within a league using the cross-sectional variance or standard deviation of the win 
ratios of member teams (Bennett and Fizel, 1995; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Eckard, 1998, 2001). 
This procedure is unsuitable in the case of English football, however, because of its divisional 
competitive structure (see footnote 1). Intra-divisional variation in win ratios may say 
something about competitive balance across the league as a whole: greater imbalance might 
be discernible within divisions to some extent. Yet such measures are unlikely to provide a 
powerful measure. Most of the action is inter- rather than intra-divisional, yet inter-division 
variation is not considered.     
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However, all PL and FL member teams take part in a competition that does allow direct 
comparisons between the playing strengths of teams from different divisions. The FA Cup 
(Football Association Challenge Cup) is a sudden-death knock out tournament involving both 
league and non-league teams. A major attraction is the cup’s propensity to produce shock 
results, such as the elimination of a PL team by an opponent from the lower reaches of the FL 
or from non-league.7  
 
Recently, Szymanski (2001) has used FA Cup match attendance data in an effort to identify 
trends in competitive balance in football in EW since the 1970s. Analysing cup attendances 
in matches where a corresponding league fixture (between the same teams in the same 
season) took place, Szymanski finds that cup attendances declined relative to league 
attendances. In the demand for sports literature, one version of the ‘uncertainty of outcome’ 
hypothesis is that attendances depend on the level of competitive balance between all teams 
in the competition concerned. Accordingly, Szymanski infers that cup attendances declined 
due to increasing inter-divisional competitive imbalance between league teams. League 
attendances are less affected, because rising competitive imbalance is mainly an inter- rather 
than an intra-divisional phenomenon. The present article draws similar conclusions about the 
trend in competitive balance. It does so, however, by measuring the latter directly, rather than 
indirectly via a hypothesised (and largely unsubstantiated) relationship between competitive 
balance and attendance. 
 
In section IV inferences about changes in competitive balance are drawn directly from a 
statistical investigation of trends in win probabilities in cup matches conditional on league 
position. Koning (2000) and Dobson and Goddard (2001) use ordered probit regression to 
model league match results in football. Adapting this approach, the model describing the 
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result of the cup match between home team i and away team j played in season t, denoted 
yi,j,t, is:   
 
Home win  ⇒ yi,j,t = 1 if μ2   <  + εi,j,t  * tj,i,y
Draw  ⇒ yi,j,t = 0.5 if μ1  <   + εi,j,t ≤ μ2  * tj,i,y
Away win  ⇒ yi,j,t = 0 if           + εi,j,t ≤ μ1               
        
*
tj,i,y
where  = γ0,t + γ1,t Li,t + γ2,t Lj,t        [12]  * tj,i,y
 
In [12], εi,j,t is a NIID disturbance term. γ1,t<0 and γ2,t>0 are expected. γk,t (k=0,1,2) are time-
varying parameters of the ordered probit model. As before, a polynomial functional form for 
γk,t is assumed.8  
 
The data set comprises FA Cup matches played between the 1921-2 and 2001-2 seasons 
inclusive (except 1945-6 when the FA Cup was staged but the league was suspended) that 
were either first matches or (first) replays involving two league member teams, between 
Round 1 and the quarter-finals (currently Round 6) inclusive. Second and subsequent replays, 
semi-finals and finals are excluded because these matches are usually played at neutral 
venues. Match results are recorded after 90 or 120 minutes’ play; results of penalty shoot-
outs are not recorded.9  
 
Since the rules concerning match duration differ between first matches and replays, the 
parameters of [12] also differ, and separate estimations are required. The estimated home 
win, draw and away win probabilities are h(z)(Li,t, Lj,t) = 1–Φ( 2μˆ – ), d(z)(Li,t, Lj,t) = * tj,i,yˆ
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Φ( – )–Φ( – ) and a(z)(Li,t, Lj,t) = Φ(2μˆ * tj,i,yˆ 1μˆ * tj,i,yˆ 1μˆ – ) respectively, where Φ is the 
standard normal distribution function; z=1 denotes the first match of a cup tie; and z=2 
denotes a replay. 
*
tj,i,yˆ
 
Let E(yi,j,t) represent the expected outcome for team i by the end of the (first) replay, 
calculated as a probability-weighted average of scores of 1 if team i wins the cup tie; 0.5 if 
the tie is still level; and 0 if team i loses: 
 
E(yi,j,t) = h(1)(Li,t, Lj,t) + d(1)(Li,t, Lj,t){a(2)(Lj,t, Li,t) + 0.5d(2)(Lj,t, Li,t)}    
 
If team i initially plays away to team j, the expected outcome for team i is 1 – E(yj,i,t). Team 
i’s expected outcome, conditional on league positions but unconditional on which team 
initially plays at home, is wt(Li,t, Lj,t) = 0.5{1 + E(yi,j,t) – E(yj,i,t)}. Variations over time in 
wt( iL , jL ) for constant values of iL  and jL  provide an indication of trends in competitive 
balance. An alternative summary measure is s(wt), the cross-sectional standard deviation 
(across i) of wt(Li,t, 0.50): the expected outcomes (as defined above) of all teams against the 
league’s median team. 
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. Panel (b) reports the estimates of γk,t for the 
first matches of cup ties for selected seasons. Panel (c) reports the equivalent estimates for 
replays. In both cases, the decrease over time in the numerical value of t,0γˆ  controls for a 
decline in the importance of home advantage, apparent in the summary data reported in panel 
(a). Meanwhile t,1γˆ  and t,2γˆ  both tend to increase in absolute value.10 Cup results have 
therefore become increasingly correlated with league positions. By the end of the estimation 
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period, any given difference in league positions counted for more than it had in earlier times. 
This in turn suggests an increase in competitive imbalance between teams at different levels 
of the league hierarchy.  
 
Panels (d) and (e) of Table 2 report further summary measures of the trend in competitive 
balance. Panel (d) reports the trends in wt(0.75,0.25) and wt(0.90,0.10): the probabilities of 
success (after a maximum of 210 minutes) for teams positioned at the 10th and 25th 
percentile of the league hierarchy, against teams positioned at the 75th and 90th percentiles 
respectively, conditional on league positions but unconditional on home advantage. These 
data show that the probability of a ‘shock’ result declined considerably between the 1920s 
and the 1990s.  
 
For selected seasons, panel (e) of Table 2 reports s(wt) as defined above. The full series is 
plotted in Figure 3. According to the theoretical models described in section II, the trend in 
s(wt) shown in Figure 3 should be linked to trends in s( t,iαˆ ) and  shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Clearly the long-term trend in all three series is upward, so to this extent the empirical 
findings are consistent with the theory. There are some inconsistencies, however, in the 
timing of the main upward shifts in s(wt) on the one hand, and s(
tβˆ
t,iαˆ ) and  on the other, 
which require some further interpretation. 
tβˆ
 
The increase in s(wt) in the 1920s and 1930s does not seem to be directly attributable to 
parallel changes in the parameters of [11] (though there were increases in both s( ) and  
in the late-1920s). The growth of a more professional ethos in football during the inter-war 
period provides a possible alternative, non-demand side interpretation of the tendency for 
competitive imbalance to increase during this period. The modern-day football manager’s job 
t,iαˆ tβˆ
 16
specification, including responsibility for all aspects of team affairs and the acquisition and 
disposal of players, first began to evolve between the wars.11 As the style of management of 
the leading teams (in particular) moved onto a more professional footing, it is unsurprising to 
find the emergence of a larger competitive gulf between these teams and the rest.   
 
The second significant increase in competitive balance, which began in the late-1970s, was 
preceded by a sharp rise in s( ) in the 1960s, and a more gradual increase in  that had 
been underway since the early-1950s. The peculiarities of pre-1978 contractual arrangements 
(see section II) may explain why these demand shifts did not feed through immediately into 
rising competitive imbalance. Before 1978 a lack of player mobility may have helped keep 
the lid on the damaging consequences for competitive balance of the shifting composition of 
spectator demand.12 After 1978, when out-of-contract players secured the right to initiate a 
transfer, these restraints on player mobility were eased, with inevitable consequences for 
competitive balance. Further sharp increases in s(
t,iαˆ tβˆ
t,iαˆ ) and  during the 1990s have added 
more fuel to the fire of rising competitive imbalance, and seem likely to explain the recent 
acceleration in the upward trend in s(wt).  
tβˆ
 
V Conclusion  
The theoretical model of resource allocation in professional sports leagues first developed by 
El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) suggests that competitive balance is demand-driven. Ultimately, 
the allocation of playing talent between teams is dependent on each team’s relative market 
size. The equilibrium allocation of playing talent, at which all teams are simultaneously 
maximising either profit or performance subject to a profit constraint, can therefore be 
expressed as a function of the parameters of a set of team-specific revenue functions. This 
article has considered the adaptation of theoretical models developed in North America to 
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professional football in England and Wales. The functional form of the theoretical 
relationship between revenue and competitive balance has been shown to be robust with 
respect to variations in the teams’ objective functions, and variations between closed and 
open players’ labour market conditions. 
 
This article has investigated demand-side determinants of competitive balance in professional 
football in England and Wales. Empirical football team revenue functions have been 
reported, estimated using annual data from the 1920s to the 1990s. A direct measure of 
competitive balance between teams at all levels of the league’s divisional hierarchy, based on 
a statistical analysis of match results cup competition, has been developed.  
 
The theoretical model predicts that competition will become more unbalanced, either if there 
is divergence between teams’ base levels of spectator demand, or if the elasticity of team 
revenue with respect to league position increases. Empirically, both of these conditions 
appear to have been met. Teams from the larger cities and towns experienced an increase in 
their base levels of demand relative to their small-town counterparts, and there was 
divergence in revenue shares. The pace of revenue divergence was particularly fast during the 
1960s and 1990s. The estimated elasticity of revenue with respect to league position has 
increased steadily, from below 0.25 in the 1920s to above 0.50 by the end of the 1990s.   
 
The statistical analysis of FA Cup match results indicates that there has indeed been an 
increase in competitive imbalance between teams operating at different levels of the league’s 
hierarchy, as the theoretical model predicts. The incidence of shock results in cup ties has 
declined over time, indicating an increase in the gradient between league position and 
competitive strength. Competitive imbalance appears to have increased in the late-1920s and 
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1930s. It has been suggested that this may be due to the emergence of a more professional 
ethos in football during this period, and not by demand-side shifts. A further significant 
increase in competitive imbalance has been underway since the late-1970s. This was 
preceded by changes in the composition of demand whose initial impact on competitive 
balance may have been blunted by a lack of mobility in the players’ transfer market. 
Contractual changes implemented in 1978 and 1995 have since eased these restrictions on 
mobility. Consequently the most talented players have gravitated increasingly towards the 
highest-paying teams, and inter-divisional competitive imbalance has risen accordingly.   
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Footnotes 
1.  League competition in English professional football is currently organised into four 
divisions: the Premier League (PL) comprising 20 teams; and Football League (FL) 
comprising three divisions (FLD1-FLD3) of 24 teams each. Three or four teams per 
season are promoted and relegated between adjacent FL divisions, and between FLD1 
and PL. A four-division structure, with total membership close to the current 
complement of 92 teams, has operated since the 1921-2 season.  
2.  Li is discrete, while ti is continuous. When n is large, however, Li and ti are 
approximately equivalent.  
3.  In practice, the number of foreign players employed in England before 1995 was 
small; the limit of three was only rarely reached, and only by a handful of teams. 
4.  While total revenues (from all sources) would be preferable in many respects to gate 
revenues, the former are only obtainable from company accounts, and most teams 
have not filed accounts consistently. For most of the period under investigation, gate 
revenues were by far the most important component of total revenues, though in 
recent seasons the proportion has fallen, in the PL and in all divisions of the FL, due 
to growth in income from television and other sources.  
5.  The classification criteria and the composition of the groups are detailed in Dobson 
and Goddard (2001). Populations are from the 1961 census, the closest to the mid-
point of the observation period. To measure revenue divergence, it is important that 
the group classifications are based entirely on ‘exogenous’ characteristics of clubs, 
and not on their performance or revenues over the period under scrutiny. Perhaps the 
only contentious issue in this respect is the allocation of London teams between G1 
and G3. By the early-1920s the four G1 London teams appear to have established a 
clear lead in popularity over the rest. Arsenal, Chelsea and Tottenham benefited from 
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early entry to the FL. West Ham joined after Fulham and Leyton Orient, but benefited 
from their unique East End location. By comparison the latter two have struggled, 
perhaps due to their geographical proximity to Chelsea and Tottenham respectively.   
6.  The polynomial functional forms are: 
αi,t = a0 +  + hi ;   βt = b0 +                m1M
1m
)g(
m ta∑= ∑=
1M
1m
m
m tb
hi are home team fixed effects, allowing for variation between teams in base levels of 
spectator demand. The polynomial trend component in the base levels of demand, 
, is the same for all teams within each of the five groups (g=1...5). βt, the elasticity 
of revenue share with respect to league position, is also subject to a polynomial trend, 
but does not vary between teams or between groups. F-tests for the joint significance 
of the six additional coefficients introduced by increasing M1 in steps of one (  for 
g=1...5 and bm) indicate M1=9 provides an adequate representation of the trend in αi,t 
and βt. t varies from 1 (1925-6 season) to 67 (1998-9 season). There is no break in t 
for the seven-year period when football was suspended during the Second World War. 
Teams with fewer than ten time series observations are excluded from the estimation.  
)g(
ma
)g(
ma
7.  The Football Association Challenge Cup (FA Cup) is the principal knock-out cup 
competition, open to all PL and FL teams, and non-league teams. The latter take part 
in a preliminary qualifying tournament. FLD2 and FLD3 teams enter in Round 1. 
Survivors are joined by PL and FLD1 teams in Round 3. Further rounds reduce the 64 
Round 3 contestants to two finalists in Round 8. From the First Round onwards the 
draw determining who plays whom and which team initially has home advantage, is 
random; there are no seedings.  
8. The polynomial functional form is: γk,t = gk,0 + . In this expression  g0,0 is 
redundant and is set to zero. Ordered probit regression can be used to obtain estimates 
∑
=
2M
1m
m
m,k tg
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of the parameters μ1, μ2, gk,m , and therefore γk,t. Chi-square tests for the joint 
significance of the three additional coefficients introduced into [13] by increasing M2 
in steps of one (gk,m for k=0,1,2), based on the omitted variables version of Weiss’s 
(1997) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, indicate that M2=3 provides an adequate 
representation of the trend in γk,t.  
9.  If the first match produces a winner after 90 minutes’ play, this result settles the tie. If 
the first match is level after 90 minutes, a replay is staged at the home of the team 
initially drawn away. If the replay produces a winner after 90 minutes, this settles the 
tie. If the replay is level after 90 minutes, 30 minutes’ extra time are played. Until 
1993-4, if the replay was still level after 120 minutes, further replays were staged until 
a winner emerged. Since 1993-4, penalty shoot-outs have settled ties level after 120 
minutes of the (first) replay (210 minutes in total). The introduction of penalty shoot-
outs in the 1993-4 season should not affect the parameters, since this change only 
affects what happens after 210 minutes’ play.  
10.  There is some ambiguity in the results for t,1γˆ  in the replays estimation, which is 
based on fewer observations than the estimation for first matches. In this case there is 
a form of selection bias against teams from the lower reaches of the FL, relatively few 
of which survive to contest a replay having been drawn away in the first match.   
11. During spells with Huddersfield and Arsenal, Herbert Chapman, the most successful 
manager of the inter-war period, saw his teams achieve previously unprecedented 
levels of physical fitness and tactical acumen. 
12.  Eckard (2001) argues along similar lines that a lack of player mobility prevented the 
NA major league baseball players’ labour market from functioning in accordance with 
the EHQ model prior to the introduction of free agency in 1976. 
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Table 1 Estimation results: revenue function 
 
Season end-year = t: 
 1926 1936 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 
 
(a)    League performance score (%) by group: 
  G1 26.9 25.5 25.1 25.7 26.3 25.0 24.1 25.9 
  G2 19.0 19.6 17.7 16.0 16.4 16.4 17.8 17.3 
  G3 18.4 22.4 24.1 27.0 30.7 35.1 36.2 30.0 
  G4 21.3 21.4 20.7 18.6 15.9 13.0 12.3 17.2 
  G5 14.4 11.1 12.4 12.8 10.7 10.5 9.6 9.7 
 
(b)    % share of gate revenue by group: 
  G1 32.8 34.9 29.0 31.7 40.2 39.3 39.9 43.5 
  G2 18.6 17.9 21.3 17.6 19.2 16.5 18.3 20.8 
  G3 21.6 23.8 24.2 25.9 24.8 27.6 27.4 19.6 
  G4 16.9 15.9 16.3 15.3 9.4 10.2 8.7 12.5 
  G5 10.1 7.4 9.1 9.5 6.4 6.5 5.7 3.5 
(c)    Group mean values of exp  (see [11]): )ˆ( t,iα
  G1 (g=1) 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.031 0.030 0.030 
  G2 (g=2) 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019 
  G3 (g=3) 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 
  G4 (g=4) 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 
  G5 (g=5) 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
(d)    Cross-sectional standard deviation of t,iαˆ  (see [11] ): 
s( ) t,iαˆ 0.5077 0.5492 0.5407 0.5258 0.6074 0.6082 0.6283 0.7202 
 
(e)     = elasticity of revenue w.r.t. league position (see [3] and [11]): tβˆ
tβˆ  0.2354 0.2277 0.2010 0.2462 0.3700 0.4536 0.4459 0.5337 
 
Note:  League performance scores (panel (a)) are calculated by expressing the sum of  
Li,t over all teams in Group g as a percentage of the sum of Li,t over all teams. 
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Table 2 Estimation results: competitive balance 
 
 
Season end-year = t: 
 1926 1936 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 
 
(a)    Proportion of home wins, draws and away wins, cup matches, 10 seasons up to and including t: 
Home wins n/a 0.530 0.531 0.464 0.485 0.500 0.487 0.453 
Draws n/a 0.218 0.199 0.244 0.245 0.268 0.250 0.259 
Away wins n/a 0.252 0.270 0.293 0.271 0.232 0.263 0.288 
 
(b)    Ordered probit estimation results – first match (see [12]):  
        μ = -0.881; μ = -0.089;  obs. = 5438   1ˆ 2ˆ
  t,0γˆ  -0.013 -0.112 -0.146 -0.172 -0.167 -0.145 -0.119 -0.101 
  t,1γˆ  1.160 1.314 1.335 1.301 1.246 1.242 1.363 1.682 
  t,2γˆ  -1.141 -1.417 -1.458 -1.407 -1.314 -1.302 -1.498 -2.024 
 
(c)    Ordered probit estimation results – replay (see [12]): 
        μ = -0.916; μ = -0.545;  obs. = 1498 1ˆ 2ˆ
  t,0γˆ  -0.021 -0.183 -0.242 -0.289 -0.290 -0.265 -0.234 -0.217 
  t,1γˆ  1.303 1.042 1.022 1.136 1.338 1.515 1.554 1.342 
  t,2γˆ  -1.352 -1.230 -1.210 -1.255 -1.380 -1.567 -1.798 -2.055 
 
(d)    Selected win probabilities conditional on (re-scaled) league position:  
wt(0.75,0.25) 0.747 0.781 0.787 0.784 0.779 0.783 0.809 0.862 
wt(0.90,0.10) 0.853 0.892 0.897 0.895 0.888 0.891 0.915 0.957 
 
(e)    Cross-sectional standard deviation of win probabilities against median team: 
s(wt) 0.1504 0.1712 0.1733 0.1719 0.1686 0.1715 0.1883 0.2261 
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